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Dear Ms. Noonan: 
RE: Gaw v. Linqle - Case No. 890139-CA 
As permitted by Rule 24 (j) of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, appellant replies briefly to Respondent's 
Memorandum of Newly Uncovered Authority (June 11, 1990). 
Respondent argues that three other experts on accident 
reconstruction testified at the trial, and thus, there was no 
prejudice in striking a fourth expert. 
It is true that three accident reconstruction experts 
did testify (Probert, Smith and Beaufort). However, the excluded 
witness was not an accident reconstruction expert at all. 
Rather, he was a human factors research scientist. (See Brief of 
Appellant at Point I.) 
The testimony of the human factor's research scientist 
was completely different from the traffic accident reconstruction 
experts. (See Brief of Appellant at Point 1(A).) 
An analogy might be an airplane accident. Suppose that 
pilots have given expert testimony. Certainly that doesn't mean 
that mechanics are then excluded from giving expert testimony. 
In this case, appellant sought to prove her case by 
putting on evidence from traffic accident reconstruction experts, 
as well as somewhat different evidence from a human factor's 
scientist. The ruling of the trial court excluded half of 
appellant's case. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. A trial court7s ruling is not a matter of discretion, 
but is instead reversible error as a matter of law, where the 
trial court rules on the basis of a misunderstanding of the law 
or the facts. Berger v. Berger, 713 P.2d 695 (Utah 1985). 
2. The trial court in the case at bar misunderstood the 
facts in limiting the testimony of Ms. Gaw's expert. The trial 
court, by taking the expert's testimony out of context, mistaken-
ly assumed that the expert had declared his inability to offer 
opinions of fact. However, what the expert actually stated was 
that he was unwilling to make conclusions of law. 
3. The trial court in the case at bar misunderstood the law 
in limiting the testimony of Ms. Gaw's expert. The trial court 
improperly prohibited the expert from offering opinions concern-
ing an ultimate issue of fact below—that is, whether the par-
ties7 behavior at the time of the accident was a reasonable re-
sponse to the conditions prevailing at the intersection. Utah R. 
Evid. 704; United States v. Kelly, 679 F.2d 135 (8th Cir. 1982). 
4. The violation of a statute or ordinance constitutes 
merely prima facie evidence of negligence, not negligence per se. 
Dixon v. Stewart, 658 P.2d 591 (Utah 1982); Hall v. Warren, 632 
P.2d 848 (Utah 1981) . 
5. The 1986 amendments to Utah's comparative negligence 
statute did not adopt a negligence per se standard. Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-27-38 (1987); 1973 Utah Laws ch. 209. 
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6. Dicta from this Court7s opinions in Jorgensen v. Issa, 
739 P.2d 80 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), and Hornsby v. Corporation of 
the Presiding Bishop, 758 P.2d 929 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 
773 P.2d 45 (Utah 1988) does not signal an abandonment of the 
long-standing rule in this state that the violation of a statute 
or ordinance constitutes prima facie evidence of negligence 
rather than negligence per se. 
7. The trial court erred in instructing the jury using a 
negligence per se standard. 
8. The trial court erred in entering summary judgment for 
the State because Ms. Gaw's original deposition raised issues of 
fact as to whether she was confused by the design of the inter-
section. Kennett-Murray Corp. v. Bone, 622 F.2d 887 (5th Cir. 
1980). 
8. The trial court erred in suppressing the changes which 
Ms. Gaw sought to make to her deposition. Utah R. Civ. P. 30(e); 
Lugtig v. Thomas, 89 F.R.D. 639 (N.D. 111. 1981). Because those 
changes created issues of fact for the jury, the trial court 
further erred in granting the State's summary judgment motion. 
9. The trial court erred in disregarding Ms. Gaw's 
affidavit. Kennett-Murray Corp. v. Bone, 622 F.2d 887 (5th Cir. 
1980). Because her affidavit raised issues of fact for the jury, 
the trial court further erred in granting the State's summary 
judgment motion. 
10. An expert witness is not required to state the factual 
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basis for his opinion. Utah R. Evid. 705. The trial court 
therefore erred in disregarding the affidavits of Ms. Gaw's ex-
perts on the ground that they failed to reveal the factual basis 
for their opinions. International Adhesive Coating Co. v. Bolton 
Emerson International. Inc.. 851 F.2d 540 (1st Cir. 1988). Be-
cause these affidavits raised issues of fact for the jury, the 
trial court further erred in granting the State's summary judg-
ment motion. Bulthuis v. Rexall Corp., 789 F.2d 1315 (9th Cir. 
1985). 
11. Both of Ms. Gaw's experts gave in their affidavits a 
detailed explanation of the foundation for their opinions there-
in. Thomas v. Metz. 714 P.2d 1205 (Wyo. 1986). The trial court 
therefore erred in disregarding these affidavits on the ground 
that the experts had failed to reveal the factual basis for their 
opinions. Because these affidavits raised issues of fact for the 
jury, the trial court further erred in granting the State's sum-
mary judgment motion. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
MS. GAW'S EXPERT NEVER STATED THAT HE WAS 
UNQUALIFIED TO OFFER CONCLUSIONS REGARDING 
THE REASONABLENESS OF THE PARTIES' CONDUCT 
UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES. HE SIMPLY REMARKED 
THAT HE DID NOT PURPORT TO OFFER LEGAL CON-
CLUSIONS. THE TRIAL COURT THUS MISCONSTRUED 
HIS REMARK, AND MISAPPLIED RULE OF EVIDENCE 
704, IN LIMITING THE EXPERT'S TESTIMONY. 
Appellant Fay Gaw proffered the testimony of Slade Hulbert, 
a human factors expert. The trial court limited that testimony. 
In their brief, Respondents Jimmy Wray Lingle and Roadrunner 
Trucking (hereinafter referred to jointly as "Lingle") do not 
contest Mr. Hulbert's expertise. Rather, Lingle contends that 
the trial court's ruling merely reflected Mr. Hulbert's own 
statements; that Mr. Hulbert conceded his lack of qualification 
to testify concerning the reasonableness of human conduct. How-
ever, Lingle has taken Mr. Hulbert's statements entirely out of 
context. So, apparently, did the trial court. A careful exam-
ination of Mr. Hulbert's statements, and a correct application of 
Utah R. Evid. 704, reveal that Mr. Hulbert should have been al-
lowed to testify fully. 
A. The Trial Court's Ruling Was Not A 
Matter Of Discretion Where, As 
Here, The Ruling Was Premised On A 
Mistaken View Of The Law. 
As a threshold matter, it should be borne in mind that the 
trial court's ruling with respect to the admissibility of Mr. 
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Hulbert's testimony was not a matter of discretion. Where a 
lower court correctly applies the controlling law, then its de-
cision whether or not to admit testimony is ordinarily discre-
tionary. That is not the case, however, when the trial court's 
decision is premised on a mistaken view of the law or the facts. 
It is a well settled axiom of appellate review that 
judicial discretion means legal discretion in the exer-
cise of which the court must take account of the law 
applicable to the particular circumstances of the case 
and be governed accordingly. Implicit is conscientious 
judgment directed by law and reason and looking to a 
just result. . . . Consequently, if the trial judge 
misconceives the applicable law or misapplies it to the 
factual complex, in total effect the exercise of legal 
discretion lacks a foundation and becomes an arbitrary 
act. 
Wasserstein v. Swern & Co., 84 N.J. Super. 1, 200 A.2d 783, 786 
(App. Div.) (original emphasis; citations omitted), cert, denied, 
43 N.J. 125, 202 A.2d 700 (1964); accord In re Coordinated Pre-
trial Proceedings in Petroleum Products Antitrust Litigation, 658 
F.2d 1355, 1358 (9th Cir. 1981) ("[W]here the matter is discre-
tionary, we will not reverse [but] we may reverse . . . where the 
district court misperceives the law or . . . misapplies the 
law"); Pitts v. White, 49 Del. 78, 109 A.2d 786, 788 (1954) 
("[W]here . . . the court in reaching its conclusion overrides or 
misapplies the law, . . . an appellate court will not hesitate to 
reverse"); Karl Kiefer Machinery Co. v. Henry Niemes, Inc., 80 
N.E.2d 183, 186 (Ohio Ct. App. 1948) ("Action by a court under a 
mistake of law is an abuse of discretion"); Braderman v. Brader-
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man. 339 Pa, Super. 185, 488 A.2d 613, 615 (1985) ("[A]n abuse of 
discretion will be found . . . if the trial court failed to 
follow proper legal procedures or misapplied the law"); State v. 
Trudeau, 139 Wis. 2d 91, 408 N.W.2d 337, 342 (1987) ("Where a 
trial court bases its decision on a mistaken view of the law, its 
decision constitutes an abuse of discretion as a matter of law"). 
The Utah Supreme Court has followed a similar standard. 
Lopez v. Schwendiman. 720 P.2d 778, 780 (Utah 1986) (appellate 
review is deferential "unless the trial court has misapplied 
principles of law"). As the court stated in Berger v. Berger, 
713 P.2d 695 (Utah 1985), "[w]e will overturn the trial court's 
judgment where there has been a misunderstanding or misapplica-
tion of the law." Id. at 697. 
As will be explained below, the trial court's decision to 
limit Mr. Hulbert's testimony was based both upon a misunder-
standing of the law (Utah R. Evid. 704) and a misapplication of 
the law (taking Mr. Hulbert's cautionary remarks out of context). 
Hence discretion is not an issue on this appeal. The trial court 
erred as a matter of law. 
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B. Ms, Gaw's Expert Merely Stated That 
He Was Unqualified To Offer 
Opinions Of Lav, He Never In-
dicated That He Was Unqualified To 
Offer Conclusions Concerning The 
Reasonableness Of The Parties' Be-
havior At The Time Of The 
Accident, 
Many words have both a common meaning and a legal meaning. 
Consider, for example, the word "agreement." In its common us-
age, "agreement" often denotes unilateral consent (e.g., "he ex-
pressed his agreement"), whereas in legal parlance, it signifies 
a bilateral meeting of the minds—that is, a contract. Gurman v. 
Stowe-Woodard, Inc.. 302 Mass. 442, 19 N.E.2d 717, 719 (1939); 
McCorkel v. District Trustees of Robinson Springs School District 
No. 76. 121 S.W.2d 1048, 1052 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938). 
The same is true of the words "reasonable" or "prudent." 
These terms have particular legal implications; but also, unlike 
such specialized legalisms as "detinue" or "laches," they are 
part of everyday speech as well. Mr. Hulbert never said that he 
was unqualified to give an opinion concerning the reasonableness 
of the parties' conduct. To the contrary, he explicitly stated 
that, as a human factors scientist, he employed the commonly un-
derstood definition of the term "reasonable." He merely remarked 
that he would not offer any conclusions concerning the legal 
definition of the term: 
Q (by Mr. DeBry): What does the word reason-
able conduct mean to a human factors scien-
tist? 
-8-
A: Well, I can only speak for myself; but 
generally I think that there's a common— 
fairly common understanding and that is defi-
nitely not the legal reasonable man concept. 
. . . [Bjehavior . . . might well be reason-
able even though it might not be necessarily 
lawful behavior under the law. 
(Tr. at 238-39.) 
C. The Trial Court Misunderstood Rule Of 
Evidence 704 And, On That Flawed Premise, 
Erred In Limiting The Testimony Of Gaw/s 
Expert. 
Utah R. Evid. 704 provides that expert "[t]estimony in the 
form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not ob-
jectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided 
by the trier of fact." Rule 704 does not give expert witnesses 
unfettered leeway to offer opinions on all ultimate issues, 
though. It is restricted to issues "to be decided by the trier 
of fact." Hence Rule 704 does not authorize an expert to make 
legal conclusions. See, e.g., F.H. Krear & Co. v. Nineteen Names 
Trustees. 810 F.2d 1250 (2d Cir. 1987) (Federal Rule 704 did not 
permit expert to testify in breach of contract action that con-
tract was unenforceable for lack of essential terms). Thus, when 
Mr. Hulbert stated that he would not purport to offer any legal 
opinions, he was merely adhering to the proper scope of Rule 704. 
Simply because Mr. Hulbert could not legitimately offer a 
conclusion as to whether the parties were acting as "reasonable" 
persons in the legal sense, however, did not mean that he could 
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[T]he testimony is not defective because it utilized 
the words of the legal standard. The words, "possess 
with intent to distribute," are commonly used and their 
plain meaning matches their legal meaning. There was 
no danger of confusing the jury. 
Id. at 136. 
To the extent that the common meaning of reasonableness 
varies from the legal meaning, it would have been a simple and 
effective precaution to advise the jury that the expert was test-
ifying as to factual matters only, and that they were to draw 
their own conclusions in light of the instructions given to them. 
There was no need to limit Mr. Hulbert's testimony. 
Mr. Hulbert's testimony, moreover, went to the heart of Ms. 
Gaw's case. It was essential to her case. The practical effect 
of the trial court's ruling was to gut Ms. Gaw's case. Thus it 
is a small wonder that the jury returned the verdict it.did. 
Lingle's contention in his brief that Mr. Hulbert was allowed to 
offer most of his testimony is little solace, and tacitly pro-
poses a rather bizarre notion of trial practice. It assumes that 
a trial court is free to hamstring and debilitate a litigant's 
case, in violation of the Rules of Evidence, so long as it does 
not exclude the witness altogether. This "half a loaf" approach 
is neither fair nor sensible. And, in the case at bar, it in-
flicted a gross injustice on Ms. Gaw. 
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A. The Enactment Of Comparative Negligence 
Did not Abolish The Prima Facie Stand-
ard, 
For more than 70 years, the Utah Supreme Court has consis-
tently held that the violation of a statute or ordinance is mere-
ly prima facie evidence of negligence. See Hall v. Warren, 632 
P.2d 848 (Utah 1981); Thompson v. Ford Motor Co., 16 Utah 2d 30, 
395 P.2d 62 (1964); White v. Shipley, 48 Utah 496, 160 P. 441 
(1916). According to Lingle's theory, this long-standing rule 
was abrogated by the legislative adoption of comparative negli-
gence, which Lingle characterizes as "the tort reform which oc-
curred in Utah in April, 1986" (Lingle Brief at 17) . Lingle 
concedes that "[p]rior to the adoption of the comparative [negli-
gence] system in Utah, violation of a statute or ordinance was 
considered prima facie evidence of negligence" (Id. at 18 (ori-
ginal emphasis)), but argues that, in the wake of comparative 
negligence, the per se standard is now the law. 
If such a radical change occurred, it occurred silently, for 
the statute says nothing about abolishing the prima facie 
evidence standard. This silence renders it quite unlikely that 
the legislature meant to alter such a well-settled rule. "In the 
absence of express statutory provision, courts will not find an 
implied abrogation of long established principles." Williams v. 
Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority, 68 Cal. 2d 599, 68 
Cal. Rptr. 297, 440 P.2d 497, 499-500 (1968). See generally 2A 
C. Sands, Sutherland on Statutes and Statutory Construction 
-13-
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B. This Court's Decisions In Jorgensen 
And Hornsby Did Not Establish A 
Negligence Per Se Standard. 
Neither Jorgensen v. Issa, supra, nor Hornsby v. Corporation 
of the Presiding Bishop, supra, support Lingle's theory that 
negligence per se is now the law of this state. In Jorgensen. it 
was held that no statutory violation had occurred. Hence any 
comments regarding the effect of such a violation were purely 
dicta. 
Moreover, note the authorities cited in support of that 
dicta: 
[I]t is well established that violation of a statute or 
ordinance is negligence per se which may be excused if 
the negligent actor is confronted with an emergency not 
his own fault. Hall v. Warren, 632 P.2d 848, 851 (Utah 
1981); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288A (1965). 
739 P.2d at 82. If Jorgensen supposedly bolsters Lingle's con-
tention regarding the effect of the 1986 legislative enactments, 
then why does the opinion cite Hall v. Warren, supra, a 1981 case 
which explicitly rejected the negligence per se standard? 
Equally significant is the reference to the Restatement (Second) 
of Torts § 288A (1965). Section 288B of the Restatement articu-
lates the per se rule; § 288A articulates the prima facie 
evidence rule. See Hall v. Warren, supra, 632 P.2d at 851 & n.l. 
Apparently, because the "per se" language was dicta, it was used 
inadvertently. As shown by the authorities cited with approval 
therein, the Jorgensen opinion was never intended to signify an 
abandonment of the prima facie evidence standard. 
- 1 5 -
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case was influenced by the erroneous instruction. As has already 
been pointed out at page 12 of Ms. Gaw's opening brief, there was 
ample evidence which the jury could have considered to excuse 
Gaw's conduct. But, because of the trial court's erroneous in-
struction, they were prohibited from taking this evidence into 
account. The per se instruction thus inflicted double harm: it 
overemphasized Ms. Gaw's fault while at the same time unduly re-
stricting the evidence which the jury could consider to mitigate 
that fault. The inference of prejudice under these circumstances 
is inescapable. 
POINT III 
BECAUSE THE RECORD RAISED NUMEROUS ISSUES 
OF FACT CONCERNING THE DEFECTIVE CONDITION 
OF THE HIGHWAY, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN 
GRANTING THE STATE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT. 
The basis for the State's alleged liability was the defec-
tive design of the highway where the accident occurred. The 
trial court granted the State's motion for summary judgment on 
the ground that the record was devoid of evidence indicating 
defective design. 
In fact, however, there were four distinct sources of record 
evidence indicating that the highway was defective: (1) Fay Gaw's 
deposition; (2) Ms. Gaw's affidavit; (3) the affidavit of Howard 
Anderson; and (4) the affidavit of David Beaufort. But the trial 
court found, and the State argues on appeal, that each of these 
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1. The Trial Court Erred In Suppres-
sing The Changes To Ms. Gaw/s Depo-
sition. 
Utah R. Civ P. 30(e) authorizes a deponent to make "[a]ny 
changes in form or substance which the witness desires to make" 
to his or her deposition testimony. As has been observed in con-
nection with the identical federal counterpart of Rule 30(e), the 
broad wording of this authorization entitles a witness to make 
sweeping substantive changes, not merely the minor editorial re-
visions or typographical corrections that the State's narrow 
interpretation of Rule 30(e) would allow. Thus in Lugtig v. 
Thomas, 89 F.R.D. 639 (N.D. 111. 1981), the plaintiff proposed to 
make 69 changes to his deposition. Those changes were, in the 
court's words, "substantive." Id. at 641. For example, he 
changed answers of "yes" to "no," and answers of "no" to "yes." 
He radically changed the estimates of times and distances that he 
had given in his deposition. (Like the case at bar, Lugtig was 
an action to recover for personal injuries sustained in a motor 
vehicle collision.) The defendant objected to these proposed 
changes, but the court overruled the objections, stating that: 
Rule 30(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
allows deponents to make "[a]ny changes in form or sub-
stance which the witness desires . . .," even if the 
changes contradict the original answers or even if the 
deponent's reasons for making the changes are uncon-
vincing. . . . The language of the Rule places no 
limitations on the type of changes that may be made by 
a witness before signing his deposition, . . . nor does 
that Rule require a judge to examine the sufficiency, 
reasonableness, or legitimacy of the reasons for the 
changes. Allowing a witness to change his deposition 
before trial eliminates the likelihood of deviations 
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30(e) is an efficient procedure 
Id, (citations omitted). 
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Moreover, what kind of justice would our courts be dispens-
ing if they denied a claimant her day in court because she failed 
to observe such picayune technicalities as those raised by the 
State? The defendant in Allen & Co, v. Occidental Petroleum 
Corp,, supra, advanced an argument similar to that now made by 
the State. It argued that proposed changes in the deposition 
testimony of a plaintiff's witness should be suppressed because 
those changes had not been made "by the officer" as required by 
Rule 30(e). The court found this hypertechnicality to be lacking 
in merit, and refused to suppress the changes: 
There is support in the language of Rule 30(e) for 
defendant's position that the witness' changes in his 
testimony are to be entered on the deposition "by the 
officer." However, this Court is not prone or sympa-
thetic to an overly technical interpretation of the 
Rules when there has been substantial compliance there-
with and there are no significant policy objectives to 
be served by such an interpretation. The Rules are to 
be liberally construed. 
49 F.R.D. at 340-41; accord Colin v. Thompson, supra. 
2. Even Without The Changes, Ms. Gaw's 
Deposition Was, By Itself, Suf-
ficient To Create Issues Of Fact 
For Trial. 
The assumption of the trial court, and a central premise of 
the State's position on appeal, is that Ms. Gaw's original depo-
sition testimony gives no evidence that she was confused by the 
intersection in question here. Thus, in its order granting the 
State's motion for summary judgment, the trial court stated that 
-21-
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(Deposition of Fay Gaw at 59.) 
The trial court therefore erred for the same reason that the 
court was found to have erred in Kennett-Murray Corp. v. Bone, 
622 F.2d 887 (5th Cir. 1980). In that case, the defendant had 
given deposition testimony and then later submitted a conflicting 
affidavit. The trial court there ruled that the affidavit could 
not be considered, and so entered summary judgment for the plain-
tiff. The appellate court reversed because, at one point in his 
deposition, the defendant had made a statement at odds with the 
balance of his testimony. That one internal contradiction, held 
the court, precluded summary judgment even on the basis of the 
deposition alone: 
[T]he alleged inconsistency in the affidavit 
existed within the deposition itself. 
Accordingly, the issue . . . was appropriate-
ly raised by the deposition even without con-
sideration of the affidavit. 
Id. at 894. Likewise here, the internal contradictions in Ms. 
Gaw's deposition precluded summary judgment. 
B. Fav Gaw's Affidavit Raised Issues 
Of Fact. 
After her deposition, Ms. Gaw submitted an affidavit (R. 
1093-95). In that affidavit, she explained that she had been 
confused during her deposition—specifically, that she had been 
under the mistaken impression that the accident had taken place 
in the merge lane when, in fact, it had taken place in the 
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Gaw's affidavit reveals otherwise. The affidavit explains quite 
lucidly the reason why Ms. Gaw was mistaken—that is, she was 
proceeding on the incorrect assumption that she was familiar with 
the intersection in question when, in fact, she had been confused 
all along. She was so confused that she mistook the through lane 
for the merge lane. This confusion not only undermined her depo-
sition testimony, but also led to the accident in which she was 
injured. "An inconsistent affidavit may preclude summary judg-
ment . . . if the affiant was confused at the time of the deposi-
tion and the affidavit explains those aspects of the deposition 
testimony." Miller v. A.H. Robins Co.. 766 F.2d 1102, 1104 (7th 
Cir. 1985). That is precisely the situation here. 
The conflict between Ms. Gaw's deposition and her affidavit 
created a question of credibility for the jury, not an issue of 
law for the trial court. See Guarantee Insurance Agency Co. v. 
Mid-Continental Realty Corp.. 57 F.R.D. 555, 563 (N.D. 111. 1972) 
("Defendants seek to have this Court ignore the conflict in 
Freedman's [affidavit] statements by suggesting that the deposi-
tion is the more credible statement. The Court refuses to make 
such a determination when ruling on a motion for summary judg-
ment") . For this very reason, the court in Tippens v. Celotex 
Corp., 805 F.2d 949 (11th Cir. 1986), reh'g denied, 815 F.2d 66 
(11th Cir. 1987), reversed a summary judgment in which the trial 
judge had disregarded an affidavit which contradicted the 
affiant's deposition testimony: 
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il !li i i opposing party * s affidavit should be considered 
although it differs from or varies [from] his evidence 
as given by deposition or another affidavit and the two 
in conjunction may disclose an issue of credibility.'11, 
6 Moore's Federal"'Practice f 56.15[4] (2d ed. 1985) 
(footnote omitted) 
The purpose of summary judgment is to
 s ep a r ate 
real, genuine issues from those which are formal or 
pretended. To allow every failure of memory or varia-
tion in a witness's testimony to be disregarded as a 
sham would require far too much from lay witnesses and 
would deprive the trier of fact of the traditional op-
portunity to determine which point in time and with 
which words the witness (in this case, the affiant) _i 
stating the truth. Variations in a witness's testimony 
and any failure of memory throughout the course of dis-
covery create an issue of credibility as to which part 
of the testimony should be given the greatest weight if 
credited at all. ---.sues concerning the credibility of 
witnesses and weight of the evidence are questions of 
fact which require resolution by the trier of fact. 
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t imOfVy , I S a f f L U a v * ,* e x p l a i n * " * ' l i e L U i i t u S i v l i * n^ v. . 
inqls'i the uuuri u^^ u*ut xc **~u i3een error to disregard the af-
fidavit: 
Even assumi ng that th+- Imposition was unequivocal, 
Bone's affidavit served to create a genuine issue which 
would preclude summary judgment. Bone's affidavit did 
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not purport to raise a new matter, but rather to ex-
plain certain aspects of his deposition testimony. 
Bone states that he was confused during the deposition 
and at one point thought that the questioning concerned 
the promissory note whereas in fact it related to the 
signing of the employment contract. 
Id. Just as the affiant/deponent in Kennett-Murray had been con-
fused between a promissory note and an employment contract, so 
likewise was Ms. Gaw confused between the merge and through lanes 
of the intersection. Whether her confusion was credible was a 
question for the jury. It was error to disregard her affidavit. 
C. The Anderson Affidavit Raised 
Issues Of Fact. 
Neither the trial court nor the State questioned Howard 
Anderson's credentials as an expert. Nor is there any doubt that 
his affidavit, if considered, is enough to create an issue of 
fact precluding summary judgment. In it, Mr. Anderson attested 
that the intersection "fails to meet accepted standards of safety 
in highway design" and "is defective and dangerous" (R. 1327). 
The trial court refused to consider the Anderson affidavit 
because Mr. Anderson stated his conclusions therein "without 
foundation" and because "they do not specify what standards the 
State did not follow or should have followed in this case" (R. 
1353). The State uses these same arguments to defend the trial 
court's ruling on appeal. 
However, the trial court erred both as a matter of law and 
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as a matter of fact. As a matter of law, an expert witness's 
failure to state the foundation for his opinion does not render 
his opinion inadmissible. Hence, even assuming, arguendo, that 
Mr. Anderson had not explained the foundation for his conclusion, 
the trial court was still mistaken in excluding his affidavit. 
Moreover, as a matter of fact, Mr. Anderson did explain the 
foundation for his conclusions. He did so in painstaking detail, 
he specified the standards that the State violated, and he point-
ed out what the State did wrong. 
1. It Was Unnecessary For Anderson To 
State The Basis For His Expert 
Opinion. 
Utah R. Evid. 705 provides: 
The expert may testify in terms of opinion or 
inference and give his reasons therefor without prior 
disclosure of the underlying facts or data, unless the 
court requires otherwise. The expert may in any event 
be required to disclose the underlying facts or data on 
cross-examination. 
(Emphasis added.) Although the issue appears to be one of first 
impression in this state, the federal courts and other jurisdic-
tions which have, like Utah, adopted the identical federal ver-
sion of Rule 705, have held that, under Rule 705, "the basis for 
the [expert's] opinion need not be disclosed as a condition for 
admitting the testimony." International Adhesive Coating Co. v. 
Bolton Emerson International, Inc., 851 F.2d 540, 544 (1st Cir. 
1988). The court in State ex rel. Human Services Department v. 
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Colemanf 104 N.M. 500, 723 P.2d 971 (Ct. App. 1986), for example, 
stated as follows: 
When a witness has been qualified as an expert in a 
particular field, in the absence of a ruling by the 
trial court which requires the expert to disclose the 
basis for his opinion as a prerequisite to stating his 
opinion on matters within his area of expertise, he 
need not state the reasons for arriving at his opinion. 
In such case, the cross-examiner has the responsibility 
of probing the material factors underlying the expert's 
opinion if those matters are sought to be questioned. 
723 P.2d at 975; accord Loitz v. Remington Arms Co., 177 111. 
App. 3d 1034, 532 N.E.2d 1091, 1101 (1989) ("the expert may give 
an opinion without disclosing the facts which underlie or support 
his opinion"); Jones v. Sanilac County Road Commission, 128 Mich. 
App. 569, 342 N.W.2d 532, 538 (1983) ("an expert may give opinion 
testimony without first disclosing the underlying facts for his 
opinion"); State v. Johnson, 215 Neb. 391, 338 N.W.2d 769, 771 
(1983) (holding that an expert "could render such opinion even 
without first giving the underlying basis for that opinion"); 
Cherry v. Harrell, 84 N.C. 598, 353 N.E.2d 433, 438, review 
denied, 320 N.C. 167, 358 S.E.2d 49 (1987) ("an expert need not 
reveal the basis of his opinion"). 
In light of Rule 705, it is reversible error for a trial 
court to grant summary judgment on the ground that expert af-
fidavits filed in opposition to the motion fail to state the 
foundation for the experts' opinions. A case very much on point 
is Bulthuis v. Rexall Corp., 789 F.2d 1315 (9th Cir. 1985). The 
plaintiff there brought suit against the sellers of the drug 
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diethylstilbestrol (DES) alleging that she had contracted cancer 
as a consequence of her mother's ingestion of DES while the 
plaintiff was a fetus. The defendants moved for summary judgment 
on the ground that the record was devoid of evidence indicating 
that the plaintiff's cancer was causally related to her mother's 
ingestion of DES. In opposition, the plaintiff submitted the 
affidavits of two physicians who attested that, in their 
opinions, the plaintiff's cancer had indeed been caused by DES. 
The trial judge refused to consider the physicians' affidavits 
for the same reason that the trial court here refused to consider 
Mr. Anderson's affidavit; namely, because of the supposed lack of 
foundation. Accordingly, the court entered summary judgment. 
The appellate court reversed, holding that the trial judge's re-
fusal to consider the experts' affidavits had violated Rule 705: 
The district court held the declarations of 
Doctors Townsend and Sack were insufficient to defeat 
summary judgment, stating: 
Although expert testimony may defeat summary 
judgment, the declaration must put forward 
facts or a reasonable basis for the opinion. 
A declaration which simply presents an expert 
opinion without factual support is inadequate 
to defeat summary judgment. 
It is not clear whether the district court ruled 
that a declaration of expert opinion was not admissible 
evidence without a recitation of the facts upon which 
the opinion was based, or that such a declaration in an 
affidavit, though admissible, was insufficient to 
create an issue of disputed fact barring summary judg-
ment in the circumstances of this case. We think the 
ruling was wrong on either ground. 
By the express terms of Fed.R.Evid. 705, *[t]he 
expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference and 
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give his reasons therefore without prior disclosure of 
the underlying facts or data unless the court requires 
otherwise" in this case; it simply accorded the dec-
larations of opinion no weight and granted summary 
judgment against plaintiff. 
Id. at 1317. 
Similarly in the present case, the trial judge did not re-
quire Mr. Anderson to state the basis for his opinion. Nor did 
the State attempt to depose him in order to ascertain the basis 
for his opinion. The trial court simply disregarded his af-
fidavit. In so doing, the court committed reversible error. 
2. Anderson Thoroughly Explained The 
Basis For His Opinion. 
Contrary to the trial court's belief, Mr. Anderson did ex-
plain how he reached his conclusion. First of all, he listed the 
data that he had reviewed: 
I have been provided a diagram of the layout of 
the Route 6-Poplar Avenue intersection. A reduced copy 
of that diagram is attached to this affidavit. I have 
reviewed the police reports and photographs. I have 
read the deposition of Fay Gaw and her affidavit. I 
have reviewed the traffic court data consisting of the 
average daily traffic count. These materials are 
customarily relied upon by highway design professionals 
in analyzing the safety of an intersection. 
(R. 1327.) An expert's statement of the records he has reviewed 
in making his conclusion constitutes an adequate disclosure of 
the basis for that conclusion. Thomas v. Metz, 714 P.2d 1205, 
1208 (Wyo. 1986). In addition, Mr. Anderson stated that the 
materials he had reviewed were those customarily relied upon by 
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highway safety experts. This further substantiates his con-
clusions. See Utah R. Evid. 703; Barson v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, 
Inc.. 682 P.2d 832, 839 (Utah 1984). 
But Mr. Anderson did not stop there. He went on to cata-
logue in exacting detail why the intersection was defective, and 
what the State should have done. The most effective rebuttal to 
the State's assertion that Mr. Anderson failed to disclose the 
foundation for his opinion is the text of the affidavit itself: 
6. In my opinion, the intersection design for 
drivers turning left from Poplar Avenue onto Route 6 
fails to meet accepted standards of safety in highway 
design. As a result of these failures, the intersec-
tion is defective and dangerous for motorists turning 
left onto Route 6. The reasons for my opinions are set 
forth in more detail in the following paragraphs. 
7. There are three major intersections in 
Helper. They all have relatively heavy turning move-
ments and all are intersections without active traffic 
control devices. In looking at the traffic movements 
and the high speed road conditions on Route 6, in my 
opinion, one of the three intersections should be sig-
nalized (i.e. have a traffic signal installed). Even 
if traffic movements on any one of the local streets 
did not meet all the hourly warrants for a signal, the 
signal should be installed because: 
a. A signal would facilitate crossing move-
ments at the intersection. For example, 
a vehicle must accelerate approximately 
80 feet from the stop bar on Poplar 
Avenue to clear the far side of the in-
tersection. This requires a long gap in 
traffic and good judgment on the part of 
the local drivers crossing this totally 
unpatrolled high speed highway. 
b. A signal would inform motorists on Route 
6 that they are entering a community 
where frequent traffic conflicts can be 
expected. 
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c. Most importantly, a signal at any one of the 
Helper intersections would provide traffic 
gaps for the other two intersections. 
8. The striping and the island are inadequate 
and pose a challenge to even a frequent user of the 
intersection. An infrequent or first-time user can 
easily be mislead into making the wrong decision. 
Traffic leaving Poplar Avenue and turning left onto 
Route 6 is a relatively high or heavy movement of about 
1200 vehicles per day. At conventional divided high-
ways such as Route 6, that left turn movement would be 
made onto the far side of the median (shaded in red on 
the attached diagram), directly into the through lane, 
or into an acceleration lane located directly next to 
the through lane. That would be a driver's normal ex-
pectancy, and the normal intersection design. 
9. I have never seen a four legged intersection 
with a merge lane on the near side of a median, except 
at Helper, Utah. Traffic turning left from Poplar Ave-
nue onto Route 6 must turn prior to reaching the divid-
ed island, and at that point, conflicts with traffic 
turning left from Route 6 onto Hill Street. The left 
turn movement onto Hill Street at times will block the 
movement of Poplar Avenue traffic on Route 6. 
10. The intersection layout separates traffic 
traveling in the same direction with an island median, 
while separating traffic traveling in opposite direc-
tions with a stripe median. This is totally in stan-
dard of care conflict with normal engineering 
practices. This conflict can and will fail to meet 
reasonable driver expectancy. 
(R. 1327-30 (emphasis added).) Included in the foregoing ex-
planation is Mr. Anderson's articulation of the very standards 
supposedly omitted from his affidavit: "[T]he intersection . . . 
fails to meet accepted standards of safety in highway design" (R. 
1327) and "is totally in conflict with normal engineering 
practices" (R. 1330). 
To be sure, Mr. Anderson stated in his affidavit that he did 
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not yet have in his possession all the accident data, that he had 
not yet visited the accident scene, and that his opinions were 
accordingly "subject to some modification after I make further 
analysis and obtain all the facts" (R. 1330). But those caution-
ary remarks are not, as the State attempts to mischaracterize 
them, "admissions . . • that [Mr. Anderson] has insufficient 
facts upon which to base an opinion" (State's Brief at 12). They 
are merely qualifications which any conscientious expert would be 
expected to make. At most, they go to the question of credibil-
ity. They do not warrant the exclusion of Mr. Anderson's 
affidavit: 
[T]he fact that an expert's opinion may be tentative or 
even speculative does not mean that testimony must be 
excluded so long as opposing counsel has an opportunity 
to attack the expert's credibility. . . . When the 
factual underpinning of an expert's opinion is weak, it 
is a matter affecting the weight and credibility of the 
testimony—a question to be resolved by the jury. 
International Adhesive Coating Co. v. Bolton Emerson Internation-
al, Inc.. supra, 851 F.2d at 545 (citations omitted). 
Given the extensive explanation given by Mr. Anderson, it 
cannot be seriously contended that his affidavit is so wholly 
lacking in foundation as to be speculative or useless to the 
trier of fact. Any supposed deficiencies in the factual data 
affect the weight of his affidavit, not its admissibility. 
Loudermill v. Dow Chemical Co., 863 F.2d 566, 570 (8th Cir. 1988) 
("the factual basis of an expert opinion goes to the credibility 
of the testimony, not the admissibility"); McAlester v. United 
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Air Lines, Inc., 851 F.2d 1249, 1259 (10th Cir. 1988); Alabama 
Power Co. v. Courtney, 539 So. 2d 170, 173 (Ala. 1989); Jones v. 
Sanilac County Road Commission, supra, 342 N.W.2d at 538; 
Jostens, Inc. v. Mission Insurance Co., 360 N.W.2d 344, 348 
(Minn. 1985) ; Liquid Energy Corp. v. Trans-Pan Gathering, Inc., 
758 S.W.2d 627, 638 (Tex. App. 1988). 
D. The Beaufort Affidavit Raised 
Issues Of Fact. 
The trial court disregarded the Beaufort affidavit for the 
same reasons that it disregarded the Anderson affidavit (R. 
1353). The preceding discussion concerning the Anderson af-
fidavit therefore pertains here as well. Mr. Beaufort was not 
required to articulate the basis for his conclusions. Utah R. 
Evid. 705. Nevertheless, like Mr. Anderson, he did explain how 
he reached those conclusions. Having already scrutinized the 
extent of Mr. Andersons factual basis, Ms. Gaw will not belabor 
the point with respect to Mr. Beaufort. Suffice it to say that 
Mr. Beaufort7s explanation covers over two pages of text (R. 853-
55), and leaves no doubt that his conclusion is premised on an 
adequate foundation. Whether that foundation is sufficiently 
convincing to make his conclusions persuasive is a question going 
to the weight of Mr. Beaufort7s testimony. His affidavit, like 
Mr. Anderson's, should have been considered. Consequently, the 
trial court erred in granting the State's motion for summary 
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j udgment. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, it is submitted that the 
trial court erred in granting the State's motion for summary 
judgment, and that Ms. Gaw was deprived of a fair trial by the 
unwarranted limitations on her expert's testimony, by the giving 
of negligence per se instructions to the jury, and by the giving 
of further instructions to the jury which overemphasized Lingle's 
status as the favored driver. The briefs filed by Lingle and the 
State have done nothing to dispel this ineluctable conclusion. 
Ms. Gaw therefore respectfully urges this Court to reverse the 
judgment below with directions that Ms. Gaw be granted a new 
trial, not only against Lingle, but also against the State. 
DATED this day of October, 1989. 
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Attorneys for Appellant 
BY: 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed four copies of 
the foregoing APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF, postage prepaid, this (j?™ 
day of October, 1989 to the following: 
Robert R. Wallace 
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH 
Attorneys for Respondent Lingle 
4 Triad Center, Suite 500 
Post Office Box 2970 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2970 
Joy L. Sanders 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Respondent State of Utah 
10 Exchange Place, # 1100 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
frll^A 
LAW OFFICES 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
4252 SOUTH 700 EAST 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84107 
(801)262-8915 
FAX 801-262-8995 
ROBERT J DEBRY 
G STEVEN SULLIVAN 
WARREN W DRIGGS 
GORDON K JENSEN 
NAYERH HONARVAR 
HAND DELIVERED 
October 31, 1989 
SALT LAKE CITY 
(801)262-8915 
OGDEN 
(801)479-7848 
PROVO 
(801)224-9447 
Clerk of the Court 
Utah Court of Appeals 
230 South 500 East, #400 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
Dear Clerk: 
RE: Gaw v. State of Utah 
Case No: 89-0139CA 
r 
T'GVl 1939 
V«r 
Pursuant to Rule 24 (j) of the Rules of the Utah Court 
of Appeals, you will find the enclosed supplemental authority for 
the above appeal. 
American Concept Ins. Co Lochhead, 751 P.2d 271 
(Utah App. 1988). The citation pertains to points concerning 
the sufficiency of the affidavit presented by the appellant's 
expert in Appellant's Reply Brief. 
Respectfully, 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
JVQAS & ^(prtiKVaA^ 
NAYER H. HONARVAR 
NHH/jn 
Enclosure 
cc: Counsel of Record 
repealed/' id. at 1183, "[t]he legislature 
hua studied and acted upon the matter." 
Id. at 1184. Meanwhile, 4<[wje must re-
spect its actions and leave with it the re-
sponsibility for further statutory changes." 
Id 
BENCH and BILLINGS, JJ., concur. 
J*\ . 
(O fmNUNMISYSTfH> 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OP TRANSPOR-
TATION, Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
REAGAN OUTDOOR ADVERTISING, 
INC., a Utah corporation, Defendant 
and Respondent. 
No. 860323-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
March 15, 1988. 
State Department of Transportation 
brought action to enforce its rights under 
stipulation, pursuant to which outdoor ad-
vertising company had agreed to remove 
two billboards. The District Court, Rodney 
S. Page, J., found that Department was 
estopped from removing signs, and Depart-
ment appealed. The Court of Appeals, 
Greenwood, J., held that company failed to 
establish injury necessary to successfully 
assert either equitable estoppel or laches 
defense. 
Reversed. 
Equity *»84 
Estoppel *»52.15 
Highways *=»157 
Costa incurred by outdoor advertising 
company in constructing two billboards did 
not result from state Department of Trans-
portation's five-year delay in enforcing stip-
ulation pursuant to which signs were to be 
removed, and thus costs could not serve as 
injury necessary to successfully assert eq-
though company indicated that costs of 
construction were not recovered for eight 
or nine years after billboards were con-
structed, construction was completed be-
fore parties entered into stipulation, and 
company in fact used billboards for at least 
four years beyond date permitted by stipu-
lation. 
David L. Wilkinson, State Atty. Gen., 
Donald S. Coleman, Mark C. Moench, David 
S. Christensen (argued), Physical Re-
sources Div., Asst. Attys. Gen., 'for plain-
tiff and appellant. 
Douglas T. Hall (argued), Salt Lake City, 
for defendant and respondent. 
Before GREENWOOD, ORME and 
BILLINGS, JJ. 
OPINION 
GREENWOOD, Judge: 
Plaintiff, the Utah Department of Trans-
portation (UDOT), appeals from the trial 
court's ruling that UDOT was estopped 
from removing two of Reagan Outdoor Ad-
vertising, Inc.'s (Reagan) billboards be-
cause UDOT waited five years before tak-
ing action to remove the billboards. We 
reverse. 
In September 1976, Reagan constructed 
two billboards on U.S. Highway 89 in Davis 
County, Utah. After an administrative 
hearing in September 1977, UDOT deter-
mined that the billboards violated the Utah 
Outdoor Advertising Act. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 27-12-136.l-.il (1984). Reagan appeal-
ed, and, before the appeal was heard, the 
parties entered into a stipulation and dis-
missed the appeal. According to the stipu-
lation, the billboards were to be removed 
on or before July 1981, unless they had 
attained conforming status under the Utah 
Outdoor Advertising Act. 
In May 1986, UDOT sent a letter to 
Reagan and advised Reagan to remove the 
signs because they had not attained con-
forming status in accordance with the stip-
ulation. Reagan refused to remove the 
signs, claiming that they were conforming. 
Because the parties were unable to settle 
their dispute, UDOT commenced an action 
to enforce its rights under the stipulation. 
The court ruled that the billboards were 
nonconforming because they were not in 
commercial or industrial zones but that "by 
waiting until May of 1986 to take action on 
the Stipulation, flu? Utah Department of 
Transportation has not acted reasonably 
and is therefore estopped from removing 
the signs pursuant to the Stipulation.11 
On appeal, UDOT claims that the trial 
court erred in ruling that UDOT was es-
topped from removing the billboards. Be-
cause it is unclear whether the trial court 
relied on equitable estoppel or laches as the 
basis of its ruling, we examine the facts of 
this case in light of both doctrines. 
Before equitable estoppel may be ap-
plied, three elements must be present: 1) 
an admission, statement, or act inconsistent 
with the claim afterwards asserted; 2) ac-
tion by the other party on the faith of such 
admission, statement, or act; and 8) injury 
to such party resulting from allowing the 
first party to contradict or repudiate such 
admission, statement, or act. Celebrity 
Club, Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control 
Comm'n, 602 P.2d 689, 694 (Utah 1979). 
Successful assertion of laches requires de-
fendant to establish that plaintiff unreason-
ably delayed in bringing an action and that 
defendant was prejudiced by that delay. 
Borland v. Chandler, 733 P.2d 144, 147 
(Utah 1987). 
Under both equitable estoppel and lach-
es, defendant must establish injury or prej-
udice before the defense may be success-
fully asserted.1 In this case, Reagan 
presented no evidence on the injury it alleg-
edly suffered. During oral argument on 
appeal, however, Reagan asserted that its 
injury consisted of the construction costs 
incurred in building the billboards. Ac-
cording to Reagan, those costs are not re-
covered for eight or nine years after the 
billboards are constructed, and it will be 
injured if it is required to remove the signs 
1. The Utah Supreme Court has held that estop-
pel can be asserted against the government only 
under certain circumstances, "fT]he critical in-
quiry is whether it appears that the facts may be 
before the construction costs are recouped. 
However, Reagan completed construction 
of the billboards well before UDOT and 
Reagan entered into the stipulation for re-
moval of the billboards. Therefore, Rea-
gan's alleged injury in constructing the bill-
boards did not result from UDOT's delay in 
enforcing the stipulation. Accordingly, we 
conclude that the asserted injury fails to 
satisfy either laches or estoppel due to the 
absence of a causal relationship between 
the failure to enforce the stipulation and 
the injury suffered. In addition, Reagan 
used the billboards for at least four years 
beyond the date permitted by the stipula-
tion. Thus, Reagan ultimately benefitted 
from the use of the signs and was not 
injured nor prejudiced by the delay. There-
fore, because both laches and estoppel re-
quire proof of injury or prejudice, and be-
cause it is impossible, under these facts, 
for Reagan to have been injured or preju-
diced, we hold that the trial court erred in 
concluding that UDOT was estopped from 
removing the billboards. 
Reversed. 
ORME and BILLINGS, JJ., concur. 
AMERICAN CONCEPT INSURANCE 
CO., Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
v. 
Paul and Penny LOCHHEAD, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
No. 860350-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
March 16, 1988. 
Insurer brought action seeking to have 
personal property award determined by ar-
.be suffered is of sufficient gravity, to invoke the 
exception." Utah State Univ. v. Sutro <fr Co., 646 
P.2d 715. 720 (Utah 1982). In this case, we need 
not reach u/h*»»li*»f n « i l « c..*— —«~ • — •-* 
2 Utah 751 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
bitrators vacated or r »o liftc' and insureds 
counterclaimed for ' *mager arising from 
failure to pay arbitration award. The 
Third District Court, Dean E. Conder, J., 
entered summary judgment in favor of in-
surer. Insureds appealed. The Court of 
Appeals, Greenwood, J., held that: (1) in-
sureds' expert's affidavit, filed in imposi-
tion to insurer's summary judgn\ mo-
tion, was not improperly conclusor> - in-
sufficient to raise material issue of i ,, 
and (2) genuine issue of material fact exi •' 
ed as to whether insurer breached duty to 
deal fairly and in good faith with insureds, 
precluding summary judgment 
Reversed and remanded. 
1. Insurance «=»602.12(2) 
Issue of breach of duty of insurer to 
act in good faith is a factual issue to be 
determined by jury after consideration of 
all attendant circumstances and evidence. 
2. Judgment «=>185.1(4), 185.3(12) 
Insureds' expert's affidavit, filed in op-
position to plaintiff insurer's summary 
judgment motion, was not improperly con-
elusory or insufficient to raise material is-
sue of fact; affidavit set forth expert's 
background and experience as licensed 
property and casualty claims manager, 
stated that expert had examined file of 
insurer's adjuster and, based on that exam-
ination, concluded that insurer had no just 
cause for initiating legal action to have 
personal property award rendered by arbi-
trators vacated or modified and that insur-
er had breached its duties of good faith and 
fair dealing. U.C.A.1953, 78-31a-16, 78-
31a-17; Rules of Evid., Rule 704. 
3. Judgment *=»185.1(4) 
Expert affidavit filed in opposition to 
summary judgment motion must contain 
sufficient factual basis for opinion prof-
fered. Rules of Evid., Rule 703. 
4. Judgment *=»181(23) 
Genuine issue of material fact existed 
as to whether insurer breached duty to deal 
award entered by arbitrators, precluding 
summary judgment. 
Robert H. Wilde, Midvale, for defendants 
and appellants. 
Dennis C. Ferguson, Salt Lake City, for 
plaintiffs and respondents. 
Before BENCH, BILLINGS and 
GREENWOOD, JJ. 
OPINION 
GREENWOOD, Judge: 
Appellants Paul and Penny Lochhead 
(the Lochheads) seek to reverse a summary 
judgment in order to proceed against 
American Concept Insurance Company 
(American Concept) on a counterclaim 
which alleges breach of the duty to deal 
fairly and in good faith, and seeks conse-
quential damages for intentional damage to 
Mr. Lochhead's business relationships and 
intentional infliction of emotional distress 
resulting in physical injury. The counter-
claim is based upon American Concept's 
failure to pay an arbitration award pursu-
ant to the terms of an insurance contract. 
We reverse and remand. 
, The Lochheads suffered fire damage to 
their home and personal property on Octo-
ber 18, 1983. American Concept was the 
Lochheads' insurer at the time. The par-
ties could not agree on the amount of loss, 
and the matter was submitted to a panel of 
two arbitrators and one umpire as specified 
in the insurance contract. According to the 
contract, the arbitration award was binding 
if agreed to by any two of the three panel 
members. The panel issued three arbitra-
tion awards: one for the structure, one for 
additional living expenses, and one for per-
sonal property. American Concept paid all 
awards except the personal property 
award. 
American Concept then filed an action in 
district court seeking to have the personal 
property award vacated or modified under 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-31a-16 and 78-31a-
17 (1977) because of alleged fraud or mis-
take. American Concept alleged that its 
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The affidavit of American Concept's arbitra-
tor, attached to the complaint, stated that the 
personal property award was higher than 
the actual arbitrated amount. He claimed 
it was signed by him only as an accommo-
dation to the Lochheads for income tax 
purposes, with the understanding that the 
lesser amount would be paid by American 
Concept. The Lochheads filed an amended 
answer to American Concept's complaint to 
include a counterclaim for damages arising 
from American Concept's failure to pay the 
arbitration award. Judge Conder bifurcat-
ed the case, first hearing arguments con-
cerning the validity of the arbitration 
award. The court concluded that the arbi-
tration award was presumptively proper on 
its face and was not obtained by fraud. 
Judgment was entered for the Lochheads, 
and American Concept paid the Lochheads 
the personal property award. American 
Concept then submitted a motion for sum-
mary judgment in its favor on the Loch-
heads' counterclaim, based only on the 
record and the testimony of their arbitrator 
during the trial. American Concept argued 
that pursuant to the decision of the Utah 
Supreme Court in Beck v. Farmers Insur-
ance Exchange, 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985), 
defendants had to establish that American 
Concept had refused to pay the full arbitra-
tion award and filed suit without any just 
cause or excuse. It further contended that 
the proceedings in the first portion of the 
case established that there was a bona fide 
dispute as to the amount of the award, 
thus precluding a finding of ''bad faith." 
The Lochheads submitted an affidavit of 
Milton Beck, a licensed public insurance 
adjuster, in opposition to the motion. 
Judge Moffat, who was subsequently as-
signed the case, granted the motion. 
At a hearing on the Lochheads' request 
for reconsideration, Judge Moffat stated 
that he had granted the motion for summa-
ry judgment on the basis of the record and 
the insufficiency of the affidavit submitted 
by the Lochheads to create any material 
issues of fact Judge Moffat reaffirmed 
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[1] On appeal from the granting of a 
motion for summary judgment, we review 
the facts in a light most favorable to the 
party opposing the summary judgment. 
As stated in Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170, 
1172 (Utah 1983), "[djoubts
 o r uncertainties 
concerning issues of fact properly present-
ed, or the nature of inferences to be drawn 
from the facts, are to be construed in a 
light favorable to the party opposing the 
summary judgment." Further, the issue of 
breach of the duty of an insurer to act in 
good faith is a factual issue to be deter-
mined by a jury after consideration of all 
attendant circumstances and evidence. 
Gagon v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. 
Co., 746 P.2d 1194 (Utah Ct.App.1987). 
Therefore, if any material issues of fact 
exist on the record before us, we must re-
verse and remand. 
[2] In the instant case, the sufficiency 
of the affidavit presented in opposition to 
the summary judgment is determinative. 
The trial court apparently viewed the affi-
davit of Milton Beck as improperly conclu-
sory and hence insufficient to raise a mate-
rial issue of fact. The Beck affidavit first 
seta forth Mr. Beck's background and expe-
rience as a licensed property and casualty 
claims manager. The affidavit then states 
that Mr. Beck had examined the file of 
American Concept's adjuster and, based on 
that examination, opines that American 
Concept had no just cause for initiating the 
legal action and breached its duties of good 
faith and fair dealing. 
Utah^R^Evid^Oi-declarertKarthetesti-
mony of an expert *£is~not objectionable 
because it embraces an ultimate issue to be 
decided by-the trier of fact"—Because Mr. 
Beck's affidavit was offered as that of an 
expert, it could legitimately reach conclu-
[3] An expert affidavit must also con-
tain a sufficient factual basis for the opin-
ion proffered, as discussed in Williams v. 
Mclby, 699 P.2d 723, 726 (Utah 1985). "An 
affidavit which merely reflects the affiant's 
unsubstantiated conclusions and which 
fails to state evidentiary facts is insuffi-
cient to create an issue of fact." In 
Williams, an architect's affidavit was 
found sufficient to raise an issue of fact as 
to the negligent construction of a window, 
where the affidavit included facts upon 
which his professional conclusion was 
based. Id. at 726. As in Williams, we 
find that Mr. Beck's affidavit includes both 
what he concluded as an expert and an 
adequate basis for his conclusion, his exam-
ination of the adjuster's file. Utah R.Evid. 
703 provides that an expert opinion may be 
based on data "of a type reasonably relied 
upon by experts in the particular field " 
Mi* Beck's affidavit complies-with Rule 703.* 
by stating that he had examined the adjust-**-
er's files ajuLderived^hia. expert opinion-
from that,jxaminatiqnj^ The- opinion-was_ 
properly ~ based- on-the-examination-, of _ 
xecorda, and. materials - of ^  a . type usually _ 
relied upon-by-experts in^his, fie\<L~JSee 
Barson v. KR. Squibb & Sons, 682 P.2d 
832, 839 (Utah 1984). 
[4] Viewing the expert's affidavit in a 
light most favorable to the Lochheads, we 
find that it was sufficient to raise an issue 
of material fact as to whether American 
Concept breached its duty to deal fairly and 
in good faith. Therefore, we reverse the 
summary judgment and remand the matter 
to the trial court for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
BENCH and BILLINGS, JJ., concur. 
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Plaintiffs brought suit against defend-
ants for default in payment of costs and 
expenses of joint venture. The District 
Court, Richard C. Davidson, J., granted 
partial default judgment and supplemental 
judgment, and defendants appealed. The 
Court of Appeals, Jackson, J., held that: (1) 
plaintiffs' motion for partial summary 
judgment was defective, as it was not sup-
ported by memorandum of points and au-
thorities, it did not state any grounds or 
\ material undisputed facts, only possible 
supporting affidavit was filed two months 
* Before motion was made, was mailed direct-
"ly to defendants, and was not served on 
"defendants' counsel, and no time was fixed 
~ for hearing on motion and no hearing was 
held, and (2) defendants' response to plain-
tiffs' motion for summary judgment was 
not so deficient as to warrant striking an-
swer; at most, court might have disregard-
ed defendants' response in evaluating mer-
its of summary judgment motion. 
Judgment vacated and case remanded. 
1. Judgment <*=»120 
Entry of default is essential predicate 
to any default judgment. Rules Civ.Proc, 
Rule 56(b)(2). 
2. Judgment <*»181(14) 
Plaintiffs' motion for partial summary 
judgment was defective, as it was not sup-
ported by memorandum of points and au-
thorities, it did not state any grounds or 
material undisputed facts, only possible 
supporting affidavit was filed two months 
before motion was made, was mailed direct-
ly to defendants, and was not served on 
for hearing on motion and no hearing was 
held. 
3. Judgment «=*183 
Defendants' response to plaintiffs' mo-
tion for summary judgment was not so 
deficient as to warrant striking answer; at 
most, court might have disregarded defend-
ants' response in evaluating merits of sum-
mary judgment motion. 
4. Judgment *=»134 
Entry of default judgment by court 
with jurisdiction over the parties and sub-
ject matter, where there is no default in 
law or in fact, is regarded as improper or 
illegal, and voidable. 
J.A. Klungervik, pro se. 
JoAnn Stringham, Vernal, for plaintiff 
and respondent. 
Before GARFF, JACKSON and 
ORME, JJ. 
OPINION 
JACKSON, Judge: 
Klungerviks appeal from an adverse 
judgment totalling $102,489.50, consisting 
of a "partial default judgment" (entered 
after striking appellants' answer) and a 
subsequent "supplemental judgment" We 
vacate the judgment and remand. 
On April 10, 1982, a document entitled 
"Joint Venture Agreement" was executed. 
The first paragraph reads: 
J.A. "Bud" & Karen Klungervik as joint 
tenants with full rights of survivorship 
and P & B Land, Inc. to joint venture and 
sub-divide Green Fields Downs, a record-
ed PUD within Uintah County [sic]. 
The signature section at the end of the 
agreement consists solely of four individu-
als' signatures—those of J.A. "Bud" Klun-
1. Although phrased by plaintiff as an action for 
default in payments under the joint venture 
agreement, the action essentially seeks an ac-
counting of funds advanced to the joint venture 
by the McRaes, the principals in P & B Land, 
Inc., half of which the Klungerviks allegedly 
agreed to pay. An affidavit of Pat McRae, con-
McRae and Pat McRae. Paragraph 4 
states that "an earnest money option will 
be executed by and between Robert M. 
McRae and P & B Land, Inc., the terms and 
conditions of which are included by refer-
ence." Because the option does not appear 
in the record, we do not know if it was ever 
executed or exercised. Paragraph 11 con-
templates that Robert M. McRae or P & B 
Land, Inc. could add additional properties 
to the venture. Paragraphs 5 and 6 con-
template an equal allocation of costs, ex-
penses and "excess proceeds" between P & 
B Land, Inc. and Klungerviks. 
A two-page complaint seeking reimburse-
ment from Klungerviks for joint venture 
expenditures was filed only by P & B Land, 
Inc. on December 3, 1984. The main alle-
gation was that 
3. Defendants have defaulted in the 
payment of costs and expenses in failing 
to pay their proportionate share thereof 
and plaintiff's principals have been 
called upon to make said payments. 
4. Defendants are in default to plaintiff 
in the sum of $22,588.26. 
(emphasis added).1 Klungerviks filed a 
timely answer that admitted entering into a 
joint venture, but generally denied the spe-
cific allegations as to what that agreement 
said of their responsibilities and liabilities 
because no copy of the agreement was 
attached to the complaint they received. 
Ten days later, on February 11, 1985, 
plaintiff filed a one-sentence Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment: "Plaintiff 
moves this Court for a Partial Summary 
Judgment based on the pleadings and affi-
davits on file herein." The pleadings on 
file were the complaint and answer. The 
only affidavits on file were the December 
affidavit described in footnote 1 and anoth-
er Pat McRae affidavit accompanying the 
taining a listing of payments advanced by 
McRaes to the joint venture and identifying Pat 
McRae as a "Joint Venturer in the Agreement 
dated April 10, 1982," was mailed directly to 
Klungerviks nine days after the complaint was 
filed. 
